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Abstract
 Given the poor level of exploitation in most states of even such
sources of revenue as have been legislatively assigned to the fiscal
domain of panchayati raj institutions, the most important issue is that of
incentives for own revenue collection. Incentives can be built into the
design of State-local transfers by deducting local revenue potential from
closed-ended grant entitlements, thus deeming local collections as
having been realised (upto some stipulated fraction of potential if need
be). Such a system can work only if the assessment of revenue potential
across panchayat jurisdictions is perceived as cross-sectionally fair, and
if it carries minimal costs of assessment for the State government. The
jurisdiction-specific indicator must also not carry policy endogeneity, with
adverse incentives for provision of public services by PRIs.  The paper
examines these issues and suggests a way by which the revenue
potential can be quantified in an operationally useful way, without
adverse incentives.  The paper also examines whether State
governments should be incentivised by the Centre to implement
decentralisation and encourage own revenue generation by PRIs.
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“All PRIs have a poor fiscal base.”
-Government of India Mid Term Appraisal of the Ninth Five Year Plan 1997-
2002: 176.
Introduction
Although the above quote is followed by a very welcome
exhortation to “provide PRIs with revenue raising powers of their own in
order to reduce their excessive dependence on the State and Central
Governments”, the quote is accurately indicative of what may be
described as a generalised revenue-pessimism regarding PRIs. It is
thought that PRIs uniformly have a poor fiscal base across the country,
when such is not the case.  There are states like Kerala, where the fiscal
base even as presently defined is not poor. What we do have in most
states is weak exploitation of the PRI fiscal base. This is repeatedly
referred to in the first round of State Finance Commission Reports, after
the 73
rd Amendment to the Constitution, mandating the appointment of
such commissions every five years.
Section II looks at the own fiscal base of PRIs as presently
defined, along with the central issue of the incentives presently in place
for own revenue collection. The section also looks at revenue outcomes,
which are the ultimate test of the incentives in place.
Any formal incentive structure necessarily requires an
assessment of the taxable capacity of each PRI jurisdiction, since there
is a need to distinguish between revenues actually collected, and
revenue potential. Given the large number of PRIs, the exact number for
which varies even between official sources,
i but of the order of a quarter
of a million, the estimation of revenue potential becomes a daunting task.
It becomes manageable if and only if the jurisdiction-specific information
required to estimate revenue capacity can be readily accessed at State
level for all jurisdictions.6
Data on the crop-composition of agricultural land use is the only
such jurisdiction-specific data readily available at State-level. It can be
used to estimate revenue potential by panchayat jurisdiction, even
though agricultural land is in general excluded from the taxable base of
panchayats in most states under present legislation.  The only revenue-
significant inclusions are the right to tax buildings and non-agricultural
land. This right is extended in one or two states to include agricultural
land, but in a manner unrelated to crop use or income potential.
 It is important to stress that it is not necessary for a crop-specific
levy of the kind underlying the calculations to be actually in place. The
argument made here is that, even if the right to levy a tax based on crop-
specific returns to agricultural land is not actually assigned to PRIs, or
even contemplated, the assessment of taxable capacity by that measure
remains valid.  It yields a way by which to obtain not merely an ordering
of rural jurisdictions within each state in terms of relative revenue
potential, but the percentage shares of each jurisdiction in total rural
revenue potential. It is also feasible because the calculations are
possible with secondary sources, which is an important consideration.
Non-tax revenue of PRIs is collected from an assortment of small
fees. The most revenue-significant of these are attached as charges to
the tax on residential and other buildings. Thus, an assessment of
revenue potential in the first instance is possible only with respect to the
tax base of PRIs.
Section III reproduces the results of a previous exercise
(Rajaraman, 2003) for the revenue potential of each district in eleven
selected states. Data limitations made it impossible to cover all states in
that exercise. These district shares can directly be applied to the total
revenue potential of the fiscal base presently in place, however defined,
or to any revenue target, to obtain the revenue capacity of each rural
jurisdiction within that aggregate target or potential.
Section IV examines the issue of whether and how state
governments should be incentivised and/or rewarded for implementing
the decentralisation process, and encouraging own revenue generation.
Section V concludes the paper.7
II.  Revenue Provisions, Outcomes and Incentives
at the Third Tier
When the 73
rd Amendment to the Constitution came into force in
1993, the conformity legislation in each state specified the fiscal base of
local government within the state. These state-level provisions are
tabulated and discussed in Rajaraman, Bohra and Renganathan, 1996.
Subsequently, barring Bihar, there was a first round of State Finance
Commissions.  A second round of reports is available for seven states
(more have been completed, as for example in UP, but not yet placed in
the public domain).
There is no national database where the present status in terms
of the notified fiscal base of panchayats in the different states is
available. The Report of the Tenth Five-Year Plan carries summary
state-wise information on whether the recommendations of the first round
of SFCs were accepted (GOI, 2002, Vol. III; Appendix 5.1). Even where
these are reported as accepted, the changes may not have been
notified. Indefinite withholding of notification is a non-transparent way by
which legislation, even where enacted and formally signed into law, need
not be actually implemented.
The judgement of the Tenth Plan Working Group on
Decentralisation is that implementation of SFC-I recommendations has
been weak in general, and indeed the Group appeals for time-bound
notification. For five of the seven states for which the reports of SFC-II
are available (see Box 1), the fiscal base reported appears to be the
same as that in the conformity legislation, with a few marginal alterations
at best.
The first round of SFC reports did not substantially expand upon
the fiscal domains as defined in the conformity legislation, based on a
widely shared conviction of panchayat inability to enforce compliance
(Rajaraman, 2000). None recommended transfer of powers of any state
government levy to panchayats.  At best, surcharges on state levies like
land revenue or stamp duty on sale of land were advised, with the
proceeds to be fully assigned to panchayats. These provisions for piling
on to stamp duty on sale of land would if implemented have added to the8
incentive to evade stamp duty by understating the value of the property
transferred.
SFCs-I confined their efforts to specifying the share of state
government revenues to be granted to PRIs, either as a percent of total
revenues, or as shares of particular taxes. The Working Group
judgement on weak implementation of SFC recommendations relates
even to notification of these provisions.
Thus, the own levy rights of panchayats are essentially confined
to the initially legislated set of taxes on buildings and non-agricultural
land (where this ad valorem levy on capital or annual value extends also
to agricultural land in Kerala and Bihar at GP level, and in Punjab at
Taluk Panchayat level).
ii Other inclusions of secondary revenue
significance are taxes on entertainment and non-motorised vehicles. The
profession tax is the only Constitutionally sanctioned local levy, but is not
assigned to rural local bodies in all states.
iii  There is a very large number
of user fees and charges. The revenue-significant levies in this class,
such as for water, sanitation, street lighting and cleaning, where levied,
are piled on as additional rates to the tax on buildings.  In addition, there
is a long list of fees leviable on the use of assorted facilities.
Incentives for exploitation of the assigned fiscal base require,
first and most fundamentally, that taxes should be classified as obligatory
in the relevant legislation. This is by no means sufficient to ensure
collection, but it is necessary, particularly if PRIs are to be further
incentivised by declaring a potential revenue target which is deemed to
have been collected. Surprisingly, the conformity legislation in many
states does classify certain taxes as obligatory; the details are in
Rajaraman et.al., 1996. Since this is enshrined in the first Act following
the 73
rd Constitutional Amendment, it has to be assumed that those
provisions were notified.
The Report of the Working Group lists only three states where
the levy of taxes and non-tax charges by PRIs is entirely optional: Bihar,
Orissa and Rajasthan.  This in itself is encouraging, because it is clear
that the first requirement, of obligatory taxes, is largely, if by no means
fully, met. Some decentralisation purists may see the classification of
local taxes as obligatory, either fully or partially, as an encroachment on
the discretionary latitude of the local fiscal domain.  However, as long as
expenditure norms are used to judge on local entitlements, that in itself9
runs counter to the general theoretical prescription that public services
should be provided in accordance with subnational voter preferences.
As long as normative criteria are used on the expenditure side, it is
perfectly reasonable to have an incentive for tax effort as a symmetrical
intrusion on the revenue side.
iv
Obligatory taxes must also carry non-zero floor rates of levy
specified in the legislation, and denial of all power to grant local
explanations. Floor rates are not generally found in present-day
panchayat legislation, but rate ceilings are a standard feature.
Permissible exemptions should be listed in the legislation, with no open-
ended provision for additions to the list through subsequent amendment.
However, placing taxes in the obligatory class by itself is not sufficient,
unless revenues from obligatory levies are deemed to have been
collected while working out State-local transfers. In this way, State-local
transfers can adjust for variations across panchayats in taxable capacity,
while assuming a minimum uniformity of tax effort.
The only test of the incentives and provisions introduced after
the 73rd Amendment is to look at revenue outcomes, but these in turn
are limited on two counts.  The first is that there is no routine reporting of
tax collection figures for the third tier, as there is at Central and State
levels.  The latest reliable figures are those collected by the Eleventh
Finance Commission, and relate to as far back as 1997-98.  Those were
used to generate per capita collections in Rajaraman, 2003, reproduced
below in table 1. States are listed in the table in descending order by
absolute per capita own revenue in 1990-91.
More recent own revenue figures are possible only to the extent
that they are collected and reported by the second round of State
Finance Commission Reports. Whatever was available from these
reports is presented in Box 1.
Between 1990-91 and 1997-98, there was a doubling in average
per capita collections across all states, from a little over Rs.5 to a little
over Rs.10, aggregating across all tiers of the panchayat structure. Thus,
the Constitutional Amendment has had some discernible revenue
impact. The per capita collection of Rs. 10 in 1997-98 is an average
across a wide range, from zero in many states, to Rs. 58.32 in Goa.10








GP All tiers GP All tiers All tiers
1 Haryana 23.68 23.68 37.42 37.46 8.79
2 Meghalaya 15.64 15.64 18.37 18.37 4.91
3 Goa 15.20 15.20 58.32 58.32 20.92
4 Punjab 12.71 15.09 29.75 34.76 13.98
5 Kerala 14.62 14.62 43.27 43.27 17.89
6 Andhra Pradesh 10.74 12.89 21.92 25.92 11.91
7 Gujarat 7.52 10.14 10.45 13.35 5.66
8 Rajasthan 4.93 7.15 3.34 7.64 3.43
9 Maharashtra 6.55 7.07 19.75 21.00 18.49
10 Karnataka 5.58 5.58 8.96 8.96 8.22
11 Tamil Nadu 2.81 4.27 7.27 9.61 11.67
12 West Bengal 1.74 2.88 2.35 3.56 4.67
13 Madhya Pradesh 2.30 2.35 4.71 5.55 15.14
14 Orissa 2.15 2.15 2.33 2.33 2.45
15 Uttar Pradesh 0.30 2.04 0.30 3.61 10.80
16 Assam 1.03 1.51 1.06 1.56 2.01
17 Tripura 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.24 22.95
18 Himachal Pradesh 0.04 0.04 1.29 1.29 65.39
19 Bihar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 Manipur 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 Mizoram 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00
22 Nagaland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 Sikkim 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All 4.23 5.24 8.37 10.17 11.76
Coeff of var 1.59 1.31 1.95 1.62
Source: Rajaraman, 2003, table 2.2.
Notes:     Figures are for panchayat “own” revenues. GP is Gram Panchayat; all tiers sum
the figures for Gram, Taluk and Zilla Panchayats. Per capita figures for 1997-98
are based on estimated rural population for 1997-98, from inter-censal growth
rates, merging the three newly created states with parent states. The sum across
all states obtained here differs slightly from the all-states aggregate in the Report
of the EFC. No revenue data are provided in the report for Arunachal Pradesh
and Jammu and Kashmir.
The percent increase in own revenue over the seven years
1991-98 has however been highest in those states where the pre-
Amendment per capita revenue was highest, barring a few
commendable exceptions, such as Tripura and Himachal Pradesh, which
had high rates of revenue growth although from a near-zero base. Thus,
the formal introduction of the third tier, far from leading to convergence in
the cross-state disparity in local revenue collection by panchayats, has11
actually resulted in greater disparity. The coefficient of variation has
increased, from 1.31 in 1990-91 to 1.62 in 1997-98.
The low growth in revenues raised by panchayats, especially in
states where panchayat revenues were low to start with, underlines the
need to embody incentives for local resource generation in the design of
the local fiscal domain and in the design of revenue transfers from higher
level governments. What is called for is a system of incentives that does
not encroach upon the discretionary latitude of the third tier, since it is
this that drives and legitimises the case for decentralisation of
governance. At the same time, there is the need to fortify the panchayat
tax collection machinery in its confrontation with local elites.
Seven SFC-II reports are available in the public domain, of which
one (Himachal Pradesh) has issued only the urban volume so far, and
the other (Uttaranchal) is a new state without any prior point of
comparison. In the remaining five, the own revenue information provided
is uneven and of uncertain provenance.  Some just report projected
revenue as supplied to the Eleventh Finance Commission. The lack of
any systematic data even in the second round of State Finance
Commission reports on panchayat own revenue collections is in itself an
indicator of the lack of importance given to defining a local fiscal base,
and enforcing the exploitation of it. Box 1 below presents per capita own
revenue estimates for the five states, pieced together from the patchy
information provided (see notes in the box).
The figures in Box 1 show a doubling in per capita own revenue
in Karnataka, a more than trebling in Tamil Nadu relative to 1997-98, and
a nearly 60 percent increase in Punjab and Rajasthan at GP level (but a
more modest 11 percent across all tiers in Rajasthan). Only Andhra
shows an absolute decline of 60 percent. With this lone exception the
picture is encouraging.12
Box 1: Own Revenues of PRIs from Reports of SFC-II
State  Year       Total             Per Capita         Change since
   (Rs. Lakh)                (Rs.)             97-98 (%)
Andhra GP 2000-01     4659.00      8.44   (-)60
Karnataka GP 2000-01     6683.19    19.20     114
Punjab GP 1999-00       7491.00    46.69       57
Rajasthan GP 1999-00     2297.87      5.31       59
All 1999-00     3661.71      8.46       11
Tamil Nadu GP 1999-00     8394.44    24.07     230
Source:  For all states, population figures are from the 2001 Census.  Revenue figures from
the Reports of the Second State Finance Commission of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab,
Karnataka, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu.
Notes: Only Punjab and Rajasthan supply own revenue figures explicitly and only
Rajasthan supplies figures aggregated across all panchayat tiers. The own revenue figures
for Rajasthan appear to include cesses on stamp duty and other state levies, which are
more properly classified as shared state taxes. The Andhra figure is obtained from
application of the percent to total income in para 5.13.1 to the total income figure in para
5.18.1, which is reported to have been sourced from the public accounts, and therefore
should be an audited figure of collections. The Karnataka figure is obtained from application
of the percent shares in table 2.4 to total GP income as reported in para 2.29 of SFC-II.
The Tamil Nadu figure is the sum of tax and non-tax entries in tables IV-6 and IV-19 of
SFC-II (there are conflicting entries in table IV-18).
Table 1 shows that roughly 80 percent of panchayat own
revenues are collected by Gram Panchayats, a pattern unchanged
between 1990-91 and 1997-98 (exceptions are UP and Rajasthan,
where higher tiers have a substantial share in collections).  It is the GP at
village level that is vested with powers of revenue collection, since that is
the tier with executive functional responsibilities. This is one of the
commendable features of panchayat legislation in India, since an
incentive exists for government at any level to collect revenue only when
it is also authorised to spend what it collects (Rajaraman, 2000).  That
then requires that the present legislation in respect of financial
authorisation should be investigated for the extent to which GPs are
authorised to spend what they collect.  This information is tabulated
below in Box 2.13
Box 2: Powers of the GP to Approve Schemes Without External Sanction
Amount Limits States
Unlimited without qualification Goa with technical sanction (TS), Kerala, West
Bengal.





Karnataka, HP, Madhya Pradesh,  Punjab ,
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh, Haryana (External TS required),
HP (without TS), Orissa, UP
Source:  Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Panchayati Raj Division.
Notes:    The information has not been updated beyond October 2000.
The picture is mixed.  There are as many as six states that fully
authorise their GPs to spend without limit, three of these only with
respect to own revenue. Others authorise them up to specified limits.
Where these limits are very low in absolute terms, at or below Rs. 15,000
as in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Himachal Pradesh clearly there is no
incentive for GPs to collect own revenue if they have no discretionary
latitude to spend what they collect.
Direct incentives such as matching grants from the State
government are among the incentives systems known, and presently on
offer in Tamil Nadu, for example, in the form of the Panchayat Village
House Tax Matching Grant Scheme. Matching grants are not
recommended here because they do not discriminate between low
revenue-raising effort and low revenue-raising capacity. This is
especially important in the panchayat context, where there can be
jurisdictions with close to zero revenue-raising capacity.
Other types of direct incentives have been recommended in a
few reports of the first round of SFCs, in the form of additional grants for
local resource efforts. Of these only two, those of Maharashtra and
Haryana, specify physical or revenue targets in an operationally useful
way (in Haryana, cash awards for specified performance outcomes on
primary enrolments, small family norms, own resource effort and14
detection of power theft; in Maharashtra, cash awards for clearly defined
targets, phased by year, for recovery of costs of drinking water supply
and irrigation schemes). These are SFC-I recommendations, which may
or may not have been implemented. The SFC-I Reports for M.P., Punjab,
Rajasthan and West Bengal recommend incentives but without
specifying the form they might take.
The most important point to note is that incentives that call for
monitoring and verification by State governments are liable to lapse over
time. For any incentive system to work, the costs of the incentive itself
have to be minimal to the enforcing agent.
The only incentive scheme for local revenue effort that is close to
costless is to have closed-ended State-local flows, where allocations for
any panchayat are made after deducting baseline calculations of local
revenue potential, which is deemed to have been collected (upto some
stipulated percentage less than hundred if need be), at specified floor
rates. In the end, it is only through building incentives into the design of
State-local transfers that endogenous pressure can be built up against
tax default by local elites. This leads to the need for estimating revenue
potential of panchayat jurisdictions, which is done in the next section.
III.  Estimating Revenue Potential
The revenue potential of panchayats can only be defined with
respect to some defined fiscal base. A jurisdictional estimate of revenue
potential with the present fiscal base is difficult, because the principal tax
found in nearly all states, the tax on buildings and non-agricultural land
for example, requires jurisdictional primary data, not readily available
through any secondary source. This is a difficult exercise even for any
state government to attempt for the panchayats lying within its
jurisdiction.
A possible alternative route to estimate PRI revenue potential
therefore is to use the revenue potential from the tax on agricultural land,
proposed as a justified direction in which to expand the panchayat fiscal
base in Rajaraman, 2003, for calculating the relative revenue potential of
the constituent districts within a state.
v  Any levy on agricultural land has
to be crop-specific, since returns to cultivation are not equalised by15
cropping pattern shifts, even within a homogeneous agro-climatic
region.
vi The district-specific revenue potential aggregating across crops
then serves as a very useful, indeed the only possible, indicator of
relative levels of rural income across districts, which can then be used to
generate district-specific revenue potential from any other presently
leviable tax, like the house tax for example.
The advantage of using inter-district relativities based on a crop-
specific tax, which in turn is based on crop-specific norms of returns to
cultivation, and finally weighted by gross acreage devoted to each crop
in some reference year within each district, is that the jurisdictional data
requirements can be easily met by State government agriculture
departments everywhere. The disadvantage is that it excludes two
important sources of rural income, from rural industry, and remittances
from emigrants to other parts of the country or the world.  Rural industry
located in villages, as contrasted with industry located in small towns,
caters to a largely local market, and therefore tends to cluster where
agricultural purchasing power is high. It is reasonable to assume
therefore that rural income from industry is strongly correlated with
agricultural income. Skilled migrants again originate from agriculturally
prosperous regions. That leaves unskilled emigration, which originates
from agriculturally depressed regions.  For these regions, no correction
for remittances is warranted in any case.
Given the data difficulty with estimating the relative revenue
potential of panchayats based on the existing fiscal base, the district-
level relative revenue from a crop-specific land tax can be used to obtain
a breakdown by PRI jurisdiction of the absolute revenue potential from
the fiscal base as presently defined. State governments can then specify
the grant entitlement of panchayats, after deducting an amount equal to
their revenue potential, confined to whatever the defined fiscal base is
currently defined to be.
The percentage shares by district shown in table 2 are extracted
from Rajaraman, 2003, where the revenue potential in each district of
eleven states
vii is quantified, aggregated across all crops. Six field crops
and one horticulture crop
viii were covered, but not uniformly for all eleven
states, because cost of cultivation data, from which the returns to
cultivation norms were calculated, was patchy in coverage, in terms of
both states and crops.  A major exclusion in the case of Tamil Nadu for
instance, is paddy.   The newly-partitioned states (UP and MP) include16
all pre-partition districts. Thus the coverage of the table really extends to
thirteen states in all, with the inclusion of Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh.
Again, the caveat about the figures for Tamil Nadu needs to be sounded.
The table is instructive on several grounds. First, it is clear that
the taxable capacity of districts varies widely within each state. This is an
extremely important issue to flag. Box 3 lists the number of districts in
each state with account for 80 percent of total revenue capacity by the
agricultural land use method adopted here. As a rough generalisation,
roughly half the districts in each state account for 80 percent of
aggregate revenue potential. There is however a range between
uniformly prosperous (Punjab) or uniformly backward (Orissa) states
where it takes 60-65 percent of districts to cover 80 percent of aggregate
revenue potential, and Madhya Pradesh, where 44 percent reach that
target. But it has to be emphasised once again that this exercise, in
addition to the exclusions listed in Box 3, excludes all horticulture crops
ix,
which could significantly alter the inter-district configuration as for
example in Maharashtra, where grape and fruit cultivation carry high
returns to land. Districts at the bottom end of the ranking accounting
cumulatively for up to 20 percent of aggregate own revenue could, with
little loss of fairness, and great advantage in terms of computational
simplification, be treated as zero revenue potential districts for purposes
of state-level allocation between PRIs.
The district shares of table 2 can be used with respect to any
revenue target prescribed in per capita terms from the fiscal base as
presently defined, to obtain the relative potential in each district, relative
to the state aggregate. To give an illustrative example, if the per capita
revenue collection target in Andhra is set at Rs. 10, up slightly from Rs.
8.4 as estimated by the SFC-II for 2000-01(Box 1), the approximate
aggregate revenue using the rural population of the state at the 2001
Census of 5.5 crore, is  Rs. 55 crore. For a per capita target of Rs. 15,
the aggregate would be Rs. 83 crore. The revenue potential of West
Godavari district, which carries 10 percent of the revenue potential of the
state, works out for those targets to 5.5 crore and Rs. 8.3 crore
respectively. Alternatively, if PRIs can levy surcharges on state levies,
the target revenue can be directly estimated, instead of prescribing a per
capita target.  The district shares of table 2 can then be applied to that
target.
Table 2 only specifies revenue potential at district level.  At sub-17
district level, the potential needs to be further disaggregated by Gram
Panchayat. This task could be left to the discretion of the District
Panchayat to perform.
Box 3: Concentration of District-Level Revenue from a Crop-specific
Levy on Agricultural Land
State   Total        No. Districts with            Major Crop
  Districts       80 % of  aggreg.             exclusions
                rev potential
Andhra Pradesh    23   12
Gujarat    19     9
Haryana    19   11
Madhya Pradesh    61   27 Soybean
(incl Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra    30   16
Orissa    30   18
Punjab    17   10
Rajasthan    32   17
Tamil Nadu    30   17 Paddy
Uttar Pradesh    83   40
(incl. Uttaranchal)
West Bengal    17     9
Source:   Rajaraman, 2003, table A10.1.
The agricultural land tax is not at present legislated in any state.
Nevertheless the revenue possibilities if such a tax is indeed legislated
are of interest since they underline the additional revenue possible from
a tax that is easy to estimate and easy to collect. The crop-specific levies
per hectare can be updated to the price configuration of any year using
the national income deflator for the agriculture sector. A crop yield
update to any year is also equally easy procedurally, but data availability
is the issue. A price update to 2000-01 of the levies calculated per district
in Rajaraman, 2003, aggregated at state-level and estimated per capita
using the rural population census figures, is shown in Box 4 (for all states
excluding Tamil Nadu, the crop coverage for which was seriously
incomplete with the exclusion of paddy). Needless to say, these are
revenue additionalities, over and above the per capita collections
presently in place, as listed in table 1, updated for five states in Box 1.
The median revenue additionality is Rs. 9 per capita.  It can be seen that
the land tax if implemented can double own revenues of gram
panchayats relative to what was collected in 1997-98 (table 1).18
Box 4: Revenue Potential from Crop-Specific Levy on Agricultural Land 2000-01
(Rs. per capita)





Madhya Pradesh 4.30 8.61
West Bengal 7.92 15.85
Andhra Pradesh 8.81 17.62
Rajasthan 9.10 18.19




Source:  Calculated from Rajaraman, 2003, table A10.1
IV.  Incentivising States
The Eleventh Finance Commission for the first time set aside a
portion of deficit grants from the Centre conditional upon States’ own
fiscal performance, but that did not touch on the third tier. (The practice
of deficit grants itself has been criticised on the grounds that it rewards
fiscal indiscipline).
In respect of the third tier, the EFC prescribed an explicit fund
flow of Rs. 2000 crore per year, of which 1600 was for panchayats.  The
inter-state distribution formula introduced a rating mechanism of States
on the basis of ten indicators, called an index of decentralisation, which
carried a 20 percent weight in the formula used for determining state
shares of the annual provision.  In addition, the formula carried a weight
of 10 percent for own revenue collections at the local level, normalised
(with equal weights) for state SDP from agriculture, as (perfectly
justifiable) measures of revenue potential.
The scheme amounted to a reward for past efforts towards
implementation of the Constitutional amendment rather than an ongoing
incentive mechanism. The formula is examined in Rajaraman, 2002,
where it is shown that the decentralisation index was non-transparent,19
and in combination with the weightage of the index by rural population,
made the inter-state allocation not very different from what it would have
been on the basis of rural population alone.
If the Twelfth Finance Commission continues with the tradition
begun with the Tenth Commission of making an explicit provision for the
third tier, there is certainly a strong case for continuing with the reward
mechanism, which can thereby set a convention and incentivise states
for similar such provisions in the future.  The two issues that arise are in
respect of rural revenue potential in rural areas, and the non-revenue
indicators of the commitment of States towards decentralisation.
Using SDP from agriculture as a measure of aggregate revenue
potential at the third tier in rural areas is certainly a reasonable start,
although it would include value addition in plantation agriculture in the six
states which have plantations. Plantation agriculture is not recommended
here for inclusion in the revenue base of PRIs, since it is already
effectively taxed by State governments, and at punitive rates.  Once this
adjustment is made, SDP from non-plantation agriculture yields an
effective handle on the aggregate revenue potential in rural areas.
The non-revenue indicators used in the EFC report are listed
below:
i. Enactment of State Panchayat Legislation in conformity with the
73
rd Amendment.
ii. Intervention/restriction in the functioning of the Panchayats.
iii. Assignment of functions to the Panchayats in the State
Panchayat Legislation vis-à-vis the Eleventh Schedule.
iv. Transfer of functions to the panchayats by way of
Rules/Notifications/Orders of State Governments.
v. Assignment of taxation powers to the village panchayats as per
State Panchayat Acts.
vi. Levy of taxes by the village panchayats.
vii. Constitution of State Finance Commissions and submission of
Action Taken Reports.
viii. Action taken on the major recommendations of the SFC.
ix. Elections to the Panchayats.
x. Constitution of District Planning Committee.
Some of these, like enactment of the conformity legislation, are
less relevant now than at the time of the EFC. The relevant incentives20
today have to move states towards transparency with respect to the third
tier, rather than demands that particular functions should be transferred
down to PRIs. Thus for example instead of requiring acceptance of the
recommendations of SFCs, what is needed is specification of time-bound
intervals for legislative consideration, followed by time-bound notification
of recommendations accepted, and full justification for those
recommendations rejected or accepted only in part.
Finally, an interesting calibration of state commitment towards
the third tier is available from utilisation rates by states of national
Finance Commission fund provisions. Utilisation rates of the provisions
of the Tenth Finance Commission are shown in Box 5.  There was a
matching revenue requirement made in the Rules governing that
provision, which made the ability of any state to access it a function of
own revenues generated at the third tier.  Although this was an absolute
requirement, not normalised by revenue capacity or potential, the total
provision was sufficiently low that it was well within reach even of the
poorer states (Rs. 100 per capita of rural population as given in the 1971
census, over a four-year period, thus amounting to Rs. 25 per year, and
a little over half that number per head of current population at the time).
The states which accessed less than 60 percent of the provision are in
general low collection states (see table 1), but there are exceptions like
Goa and Punjab in the group.
Box 5: Utilisation of Tenth Finance Commission Provisions
Class intervals States Frequency
Equal to 100% Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, J & K,
Kerala, Mizoram, Orissa, Rajasthan,
Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal.
11
80% - 100% Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh
4
60% - 80% Maharashtra, Tripura 2
40% - 60% Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland,
Punjab
5
20% - 40% Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bizarre 3
Source:   See source to Box 2.21
V.   Conclusion
The principal responsibility for setting up an incentive structure
for local revenue collection lies with State governments. If the Twelfth
Finance Commission continues the tradition of making an explicit
provision for the third tier, States themselves can be incentives to
improve local revenue collection with the kind of reward mechanism
introduced by the Eleventh Commission, in expectation of similar such
provisions in the future. For this purpose, local revenues can be
normalised by SDP from non-plantation agriculture, as the best possible
indicator of local revenue potential across states.  In terms of non-
revenue indicators of State-level commitment to decentralisation, Central
funding provisions could usefully be calibrated to time-bound elections
and appointment of SFCs, time-bound intervals for legislative
consideration and acceptance of SFC recommendations (total or partial
as the case may be, or outright rejection with reasons), and time-bound
notification of the accepted recommendations. There is need for a
national data base with continual updates on provisions pertaining to
PRIs across states.
Any State-level incentive system requires three properties to
work in practice. It must carry minimal costs of assessment and
enforcement (performance targets are costly to monitor), must be cross-
sectionally fair in assessment of revenue potential across panchayat
jurisdictions, and must distinguish between revenue effort and the
underlying revenue potential  (matching grants fail on the last count).
Most of all, State grants must not be so structured as to carry adverse
policy incentives.  A grant system inversely calibrated to local facilities for
example will generate adverse incentives for keeping these under-
supplied.
The only cost-effective way to incentivise revenue collection is to
have a system of norm-based closed-ended grants from State
governments, where allocations for any panchayat are made after
deducting baseline calculations of local revenue potential, which is
deemed to have been collected (upto some stipulated percentage less
than hundred if need be), at specified floor rates. This calls for a minimal-
cost method of estimating jurisdiction-specific revenue potential. Other
supporting requirements are that all or a subset of local taxes should be
classified as obligatory, to fortify PRIs in their confrontation with local22
taxable elites. This is already in place in all but three states (Bihar,
Orissa and Rajasthan). However, there is no specified non-zero floor rate
of levy, or explicit denial of the power to grant exemptions. Also and very
importantly, collection incentives will be reduced if PRI discretion to
spend from their own collections is capped, as is presently the case in all
but six states.
Revenue potential can only be defined with respect to some
defined fiscal base.  The problem however is that the present fiscal base,
consisting principally of the tax on buildings and non-agricultural land,
requires jurisdictional data on structures. This kind of data is not readily
available through secondary sources.  The paper recommends therefore
that revenue potential be estimated from crop-specific returns to
agricultural land, from data easily obtainable from State government
agriculture departments, and aggregated across gross acreage under
each crop by PRI jurisdiction in some reference year. Rural industry
located in villages, as contrasted with industry located in small towns,
caters to a largely local market, and therefore tends to cluster where
agricultural purchasing power is high. It is reasonable to assume
therefore that rural income from industry is strongly correlated with
agricultural income. Skilled migrants again originate from agriculturally
prosperous regions. Thus, agricultural potential is a good indicator of
non-agricultural as well as remittance income.
A tax based on crop-specific returns to agricultural land is not at
present leviable by PRIs in any state. Three states grant PRIs the right to
tax agricultural land, but in a manner unrelated to crop use or income
potential. The justification for using the inter-district relativities based on
returns to land is that it is the most cost-effective indicator by which to
generate district shares of any other presently leviable tax, like the house
tax for example. Further extension to sub-district jurisdictions is also
possible, with data easily available at state-level.
Non-tax revenue of PRIs is collected from an assortment of small
fees. The most revenue-significant of these are attached as charges to
the tax on residential and other buildings. Thus, an assessment of
revenue potential in the first instance is possible only with respect to the
tax base of PRIs.
A crop-specific tax on land could carry clear revenue additionality
in the fiscal system as a whole, and is feasible as a local levy, as argued23
in Rajaraman, 2003. An update to 2000-01 prices of the additional
revenue estimated there works out to Rs. 9 per capita, at the median of
the ten states covered. (The latest figures from the Report of the
Eleventh Finance Commission show the mean per capita collection
across all states for 1997-98 at Rs. 10 per capita). Roughly half the
districts in each state account for 80 percent of aggregate revenue
potential. Districts at the bottom end of the ranking, accounting
cumulatively for up to 20 percent of aggregate own revenue, could with
little loss of fairness, and considerable computational simplification, be
treated as zero revenue potential districts for purposes of distributing
state grants between PRIs.
The target revenue for all PRIs in aggregate can be prescribed in
per capita terms. Alternatively, if PRIs can levy surcharges on state
levies, the target revenue can be directly estimated.
The lack of importance given to local revenue generation is
reflected in the lack of systematic data on own revenue collections by
PRIs in the second round of SFC reports. The sketchy information in the
five states for which reports are available suggests that there has been
some improvement in own revenue collections beyond 1997-98, the
latest year for which data are obtainable from the Report of the Eleventh
Finance Commission. With the lone exception of Andhra, which shows
an absolute decline of 61 percent, the picture is encouraging.









1. West Godavari 10.34 13. Kurnool 3.68
2. Krishna 8.77 14. Prakasam 3.48
3. Karimnagar 7.14 15. Medak 2.57
4. Guntur 6.76 16. Srikakulam 2.44
5. East Godavari 6.62 17. Mahbubnagar 2.33
6. Warangal 6.61 18. Vizianagaram 2.33
7. Nalgonda 6.27 19. Cuddapah 2.30
8. Ananthapur 6.09 20. Adilabad 2.03
9. Chittoor 5.17 21. Visakhapatnam 1.07
10. Nellore 4.66 22. Rangareddy 0.96










Total 100.00 Total 100.00
1. Junagarh 16.55 Sirsa 12.18
2. Rajkot 15.36 Fatehabad 9.20
3. Amreli 9.54 Hisar 8.75
4. Surendranagar 8.93 Jind 8.30
5. Bhavnagar 7.84 Karnal 8.13
6. Jamnagar 6.93 Kaithal 7.87
7. Mehsana 6.40 Kurukshetra 6.44
8. Banaskantha 5.23 Yamunanagar 5.37
9. Vadodara 4.37 Sonipat 4.91
10. Kutch 4.22 Ambala 4.31
11. Ahmedabad 3.94 Bhiwani 4.18
12. Sabarkantha 3.60 Faridabad 3.89
13. Broach 3.20 Panipat 3.83
14. Panchmahal 1.69 Rohtak 3.57
15. Kheda 0.91 Jhajjar 2.91
16. Surat 0.67 Gurgaon 2.85
17. Gandhinagar 0.48 Rewari 1.47
18. Dangs 0.11 Mahendragarh 1.38
19. Valsad 0.03 Panchkula 0.46
Punjab West Bengal
Total 100.00 Total 100.00
1. Sangrur 14.42 Midnapore 19.12
2. Firozepur 13.13 Burdwan 14.93
3. Amritsar 10.03 Bankura 8.83
4. Ludhiana 9.36 Hooghly 8.31
5. Patiala 8.51 Birbhum 7.17
6. Bathinda 6.26 Murshidabad 6.29
7. Gurdaspur 5.61 Nadia 5.24
8. Moga 4.67 24-Parganas(N) 4.87
9. Mansa 4.59 Purulia 3.96
10. Jalandhar 4.56 24-Parganas(S) 3.95
11. Muktsar 3.72 Malda 3.82
12. Faridkot 3.16 Uttar Dinajpur 3.31
13. Fatehgarh Sahib 3.12 Dakshin Dinajpur 2.91
14. Kapurthala 2.89 Cooch Behar 2.75
15. Hoshiarpur 2.43 Jalpaiguri 2.09
16. Ropar 1.93 Howrah 2.02









Total 100.00 Total 100.00
1. Buragarh 9.92 Ganganagar 15.16
2. Ganjam 9.25 Hanumangarh 9.45
3. Mayurbhanj 5.04 Alwar 8.12
4. Cuttack 4.94 Bharatpur 6.40
5. Bhadrak 4.74 Jaipur 4.53
6. Khurda 4.02 Bundi 3.86
7. Jajpur 3.99 Kota 3.54
8. Puri 3.87 Dausa 3.46
9. Nawrangpur 3.76 Jhunjhunu 3.41
10. Koraput 3.66 Jalore 3.17
11. Dhenkanal 3.55 Nagaur 3.05
12. Sambalpur 3.55 Tonk 3.04
13. Kedrapara 3.48 S.Madhopur 2.96
14. Nayagarh 3.34 Bikaner 2.59
15. Balasore 3.31 Jodhpur 2.57
16. Jagatsinghpur 3.07 Pali 2.34
17. Bolangir 2.85 Baran 2.33
18. Sonepur 2.84 Sikar 2.31
19. Sundargarh 2.83 Bhilwara 2.23
20. Kalahandi 2.74 Karoli 2.15
21. Keonjhar 2.66 Dholpur 2.05
22. Malkangiri 2.21 Chittorgarh 1.93
23. Rayagada 2.12 Sirohi 1.21
24. Nawapara 1.57 Ajmer 1.19
25. Gajapatti 1.46 Banswara 1.18
26. Angul 1.36 Udaipur 1.15
27. Phulbani 1.10 Jhalawar 0.99
28 Jharsuguda 1.04 Jaisalmer 0.98
29 Boudh 0.95 Barmer 0.86











Total 100.00 Total 100.00
1. Jalgaon 12.03 Villupuram 8.64
2. Kolhapur 11.30 Dharmapuri 8.35
3. Ahmadnagar 7.67 Thiruvallur 7.44
4. Satara 6.57 Vellore 7.30
5. Solapur 5.37 Erode 7.23
6. Parbhani 5.31 Namakkal 7.12
7. Sangli 5.19 Salem 5.85
8. Pune 5.16 Kancheepuram 5.83
9. Aurangabad 5.03 Cuddalore 5.78
10. Dhule 4.30 Dindugul 5.76
11. Jalna 4.26 Perambur 5.22
12. Yavatmal 4.14 Coimbatore 4.81
13. Akola 4.03 Tiruchirapalli 3.10
14. Nasik 3.90 Tiruvannamalai 2.95
15. Bid 2.77 Pudukottai 2.31
16. Nanded 2.72 Madurai 2.16
17. Buldana 2.58 Virudunagar 2.10
18. Amravati 2.50 Tirunalveli 2.01
19. Wardha 1.34 Theni 1.60
20. Latur 1.24 Karur 1.30
21. Osmanabad 0.16 Thanjavur 1.14
22. Chandrapur 0.71 Ramanathapuram 0.65
23. Nagpur 0.59 Sivagangai 0.45
24. Bhandara 0.11 Nagapattinam 0.44
25. Gadchiroli 0.00 Thoothukudi 0.23
26. Greater Bombay 0.00 Thiruvarur 0.22
27. Raigarh 0.00 Kanya Kumari
28. Ratnagiri 0.00 Chennai 0.00
29. Sindhudurg 0.00 Nilgiris 0.00








Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
Total 100.00 Total 100.00
1. Muzzaffarnagar 5.21 Morena 7.23
2. Bijnor 4.71 Ujjain 5.18
3. Kheri 4.64 Bhind 4.92
4. Saharanpur 3.22 Sheopur 4.04
5. Meerut 2.92 Indore 3.65
6. Shahjahanpur 2.70 Dhar 3.62
7. Bareilly 2.68 Gwalior 3.61
8. Sitapur 2.65 Vidisha 3.59
9. Moradabad 2.47 Hoshangabad 3.51
10. Badaun 2.29 Sehore 3.04
11. J.B.PhuleNagar 2.25 Chattarpur 3.02
12. Pilibhit 2.23 Shivpuri 3.01
13. Hardoi 2.12 Dewas 2.84
14. Bulandshahr 2.11 Ratlam 2.81
15. KushiNagr 2.05 Tikamgarh 2.76
16. Azamgarh 1.80 Sagar 2.75
17. Rampur 1.71 Shajapur 2.74
18. Bagpat 1.63 Satna 2.66
19. Agra 1.61 Guna 2.54
20. Aligarh 1.58 Raisen 2.37
21. Maharajganj 1.54 Mandsaur 2.06
22. Ghaziabad 1.50 Rewa 1.91
23. Sultanpur 1.48 Chindwara 1.78
24. Barabanki 1.46 Harda 1.70
25. Haridwar 1.45 Rajgarh 1.61
26. Mathura 1.42 Datia 1.58
27. Etah 1.39 Narsimpur 1.52
28. Gonda 1.35 East Nimar 1.45
29. Jaunpur 1.32 Jabalpur 1.39
30. Ambedkarnagar 1.21 Bhopal 1.36
31. Deoria 1.19 Betul 1.36
32. Ghazipur 1.16 West Nimar (Khargaon) 1.32
33. Basti 1.16 Damoh 1.30
34. Gorakhpur 1.14 Neemach 1.23
35. Raebareli 1.12 Katni 1.06
36. Allahabad 1.12 Jhalva 1.05
37. Fatehpur 1.09 Panna 0.84
38. Unnao 1.07 Sidhi 0.75
39. KanpurDehat 1.05 Seoni 0.70
40. Mainpuri 1.05 Wadwani 0.67
41. Bahraich 1.03 Dindori 0.66
42. U.S.Ngr 1.02 Mandla 0.57
43. Balliah 1.01 Sarguja 0.51
44. Kanpur City 0.94 Shahdol 0.37








46. Faizabad 0.89 Balaghat 0.19
47. Chandauli 0.88 Koriya 0.11
48. Pratapgarh 0.81 Bilaspur 0.10
49. Tehrigarhwal 0.79 Durg 0.10
50. Farrukabad 0.76 Raipur 0.09
51. Balrampur 0.75 Jushpur 0.08
52. Auraiya 0.75 Rajnandgaon 0.08
53. Mirzapur 0.74 Bastar 0.08
54. Mau 0.73 Kwardha 0.06
55. Firozabad 0.72 Dantewada 0.04
56. Etawah 0.70 Kankar 0.03
57. Hatharas 0.65 Korba 0.02
58. SantKabirNgr 0.62 Raigarh 0.02
59. Varanasi 0.60 Dhamtari 0.02
60. Jalaun 0.59 Mahasamund 0.02























Source:     Rajaraman, 2003.
Notes:    The 83 districts of Uttar Pradesh include 13 now in Uttaranchal, and the 61
districts of Madhya Pradesh include the 16 now in Chhattisgarh. The 19 districts of Gujarat
are before the carving of 6 additional districts to the present day total of 25. Likewise the 30
districts of Maharashtra do not include the 5 new districts which make the present day total
of 35.  The total State and district-level revenues are obtained from crop composition of
agricultural land use in the years 1997-98 and 1998-99. Aggregated across crops, using
norms of crop-specific returns to land from cost of cultivation data in secondary sources
pertaining to the mid-nineties.29
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Endnotes
                                                       
i A total of 247033 according to the Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission,
but only 238682 according the Report of the Working Group on Decentralised
Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan, 2002, a
later and possibly more accurate source.
ii The Report of the SFC-II for Punjab somewhat confusingly recommends
extension to agricultural land of what it calls the legislated land tax at GP level,
but the land tax was vested in TPs in the legislation, and already extended to
agricultural land (see Rajaraman et. al., 1996).
iii  Kerala is the lone exception.
iv    See Sen and Trebisch, 2003,  a recent statement of the case for not having an
                incentive for tax effort imposed by higher level grant-giving governments.
v  This paper does not see any purpose to repeating the justification for that
recommendation, since there is a book-length treatment in Rajaraman, 2003.
vi  Any of a number of barriers to entry, ranging from factor-specificity to
imperfections in credit markets can prevent factor shifts to the most profitable
crop in a region.
vii  District crop yield data, were available in published form only for these eleven
states for recent years (1997-98 or 1998-99).
viii  The six were two cereal (paddy, wheat), two oilseed (groundnut, rapeseed/
mustardseed), two commercial (sugarcane, cotton) and the horticulture crop was
potato.
ix  Except for the potato crop in West Bengal